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introduction *
Prior to the start of the 2008 war in South Osse-
tia, the conflicts of the South Caucasus were seen by 
Ukrainians as nothing more than the outcome of 
contemporary international politics. Even though 
these conflicts developed and played out on the ter-
ritory of the former Soviet Union, they were not es-
pecially important to Ukrainians. But starting from 
the first day of the war on 8 August 2008, such per-
ceptions began to change as events in South Ossetia, 
Georgia, and Abkhazia began to influence the inter-
nal politics of Ukraine.
The advance of Georgian troops on Tskhinvali 
(or Tskhinval, as the city is called in the Ossetian 
language) on 8 August 2008, and the succeeding 
Georgian–Russian military conflict, served to pro-
voke serious political confrontations among Ukrai-
nian political elites. These confrontations in turn 
revealed the deeply rooted cleavages that exist in 
Ukrainian society. The conflict in the Caucasus, 
though seemingly far away, has had unpredictable 
repercussions not only for Ukrainian political life, 
but also for Ukraine’s fragile economy.
The South Ossetian conflict’s impact on Ukraine – 
not only on Ukraine’s internal and international po-
litics, but also on its public opinion and state insti-
tutions – is of prime importance for academics hop-
ing to understand post-Soviet Ukrainian society and 
other types of culturally and civilizationally divided 
* The materials of this article are based on the author’s pre-
sentation at the International Symposium “Trans-Border Politics in 
the Black Sea Rim” held at Hokkaido University (Sapporo, Japan) 
on 5–6 of March, 2009 [1].
societies. It is also important for those who hope to 
work out a realistic set of policies of national recon-
ciliation for Ukraine, policies which aim to preserve 
Ukraine as a united nation. The Russian–Georgian 
conflict demonstrated the dire weaknesses of the po-
litical system in Ukraine, as well as the risks of of-
ficial attempts in Ukraine to conduct various hege-
monic policies that benefit one cultural or political 
group at the expense of the others.
The Stages of the conflict and its 
interpretations in ukraine
The 2008 war in South Ossetia had two clear-cut 
and distinct stages: (a) several days during which 
Georgian troops advanced on Tskhinvali, and then 
(b) the days during which those troops were mili-
tarily routed by the Russians and South Ossetians. 
Georgia’s defeat by the Russians was then followed 
by weeks and months of control of large parts of 
Georgia by the Russian Army. This “periodization” 
is also relevant to the war’s effects on Ukraine’s 
politics.
The first days of Georgia’s initial “military suc-
cess” in Tskhinvali (which saw a significant number 
of casualties for South Ossetians and Russian peace-
keepers) was not accompanied in Ukraine by “patri-
otic celebrations of a victory over separatists,” as 
was reported by the Russian media regarding the 
celebrations of some Georgian diaspora in Mos-
cow. But certainly, the events were welcomed by 
many high-ranking Ukrainian officials and politi-
cians whose political values incorporated the slogan 
which had long ago, in the 1930’s, been launched 
by the words of the famous national-Communist 
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Mykola Khvyliovyi: “Het’ vid Mos kvy.” In other 
words, “Let’s go as far as possible from Moscow.” 
The Ukrainians belonging to this political trend 
were ready to greet the success of Mikhail Saakash- 
vili in defeating the separatists. And accordingly, 
the purpose of Ukraine’s official massive supply of 
weapons to Georgia (prior to the 2008 war) did not 
oppose the idea of the “reunification of Georgia” via 
the “legitimate use of force.”
A second trend in Ukrainians’ perceptions dur-
ing the initial days of the war in South Ossetia, quite 
critical of Georgian leadership’s politics, stemmed 
from a profound lack of understanding as to how 
Russia would respond. Would Russia again let 
things transpire like it did in the Serbian Krajna in 
Croatia in 1995? (But those were the times of Boris 
Yeltsyn, which have already passed long ago).
Representatives of a third trend (to which the au-
thor of the present article belonged to) were suppos-
ing that it must be a skilled manoeuvre of Russia, 
creating for Mr. M. Saakashvili and his team a trap 
similar to that which the US had allegedly prepared 
in 1990 for Saddam Hussein (in fact, offering him a 
chance to attack Kuwait, but not the chance to get 
away with it).
And a fourth trend’s adherents just watched and 
thought of how better to adapt themselves to the 
changing circumstances.
The second stage of the war has brought in some 
other emotions and questions and reformulated the 
arguments used in support of various trends’ 
(camps’) views and assessments.
A first group mentioned above had split into two 
camps. One camp continued uncritically supporting 
Georgian president Mikhail Saakashvili. For exam-
ple, the President of Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko, 
personally visited Tbilisi and spoke there at a large 
meeting, together with the top leaders of Poland and 
the Baltic states. V. Yushchenko’s speech was not 
openly anti-Russian, like that of the Polish presi-
dent, but its thrust should be more properly under-
stood not in terms of the rhetoric used as much as in 
the “message” itself. V. Yushchenko clearly took on 
the side of the Georgian leadership.
A second camp of Ukrainian elites (and the pub-
lic in general) adopted a more balanced approach – 
criticising both M. Saakashvili and V. Putin, albeit 
for different wrongdoings. Among the basically an-
ti-Russian and pro-Euro-Atlantic politicians that 
took this second stance, the most prominent was the 
talented politician and ex-Minister of Defence of 
Ukraine, Anatoli Gritsenko.
A third camp among both the Ukrainian elite and 
the public took a different tack, opting to show its 
pride in the fact that Russia “did not forget those 
who asked for her support and understanding.” 
Though some of the political analysts in this camp 
did point out publicly that the arguments employed 
by Russia’s leadership against the Georgian one 
were often inadequate and counterproductive, they 
nonetheless took the Russian Federation’s and South 
Ossetian side in the conflict. Still, this third group 
went about its support for Russia and South Ossetia 
in a nuanced way. For example, the core issue as 
they saw it was the protection of the human rights 
and lives of Ossetian civilians, and of Russian 
peacekeepers who were ruthlessly killed in an at-
tack on Tskhinvali ∗, rather than the issue of Russia 
wanting to protect its “citizens” (Russia had previ-
ously given most South Ossetians citizenship). In-
deed, Russia’s official arguments about the need to 
protect its citizens did not always play well in 
Ukraine, where they created tensions in light of the 
possible claims in the future to interfere “on behalf 
of its citizens” in Sevastopol and the Autonomous 
Republic of Crimea. Similar tensions must be avoid-
ed in some of Ukraine’s areas bordering with Hun-
gary and Romania, where those two states are ex-
tensively granting either their “foreign compatriot’s” 
(“foreign Hungarian”) passports for ethnic Hungar-
ians, or their citizenship – as Romania does to those 
who themselves, or whose parents or grandparents, 
have been living in the territories controlled by Ro-
mania prior to the Second World War.
Some analysts belonging to this group were also 
wondering if the 2008 war represented not only 
a political “trap” for Georgia (having now created 
a unique, favourable chance for an independent 
South Ossetia and an independent Abkhazia), but 
also – on a larger scale and in a longer perspective – 
a “historic trap” for present-day Russia, for whom it 
is still early to start independently undermining the 
world hegemony of the USA. Even China still does 
not dare to act so openly and radically while oppos-
ing a unipolar world model.
Finally, a fourth camp among Ukrainian public 
opinion was formed around the traditional folkloric 
principle of a number of Ukrainians: “Moia khata 
skraiu,” or “My house is aside.” This group was 
comprised of political elites whose perception of 
their mission was simply to avoid any confrontation 
with Russia at the same time as they tried to please 
the West. Members of this group wanted to show 
that they accept the European Union’s points of 
view on the South Ossetian conflict; and they even 
offered Georgia some humanitarian aid. This group’s 
* In this regard, M. Saakashvili went much further than did the 
US General Wesley Clark nine years earlier, in June 1999 (at that 
time the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO forces in Europe) – 
he gave the direct command to a column of 30,000 NATO allied 
troops advancing towards Pristina airfield in Serbia’s Kosovo to 
overpower the 200 or so Russian paratroopers who came to Pristina 
airfield just a bit earlier than the NATO troops. In fact, in 1999 no 
politician dared to actually give the military a license to kill the 
Russian peacekeepers [2].
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viewpoint was espoused by Ukrainian Prime Minis-
ter Yulia Tymoshenko and her political allies.
The conflict in (and around) South Ossetia had 
many dimensions for Ukrainians. These included 
(1) the geopolitical level, where Georgia was seen 
not as an independent political actor per se, but rath-
er as a client of another actor, such as the United 
States or the West; (2) the basic national level, 
which involved primarily economic and security in-
terests; (3) the level of relations with particular 
states, or their unions (or coalitions); (4) the inter-
personal level, which involved personal relations 
and inter-clan relations among the national elites 
(e.g. presidents of Ukraine and Georgia and their 
families had maintained very close personal friend-
ships, sometimes at the expense of the national in-
terest of Ukraine) [3]; (5) the institutional level, as it 
concerns relations within the country; and (6) the 
civilizational level, especially as it concerns “civili-
zational codes” and “historic memory.” All of these 
levels of understanding impacted the particular situ-
ation of contemporary Ukraine and have been very 
conflictogenic. To understand why requires some 
additional clarification of the peculiarities of the 
present situation in Ukraine.
basic concepts related  
to contemporary politics in ukraine
To understand the influence of the South Os-
setian conflict on Ukraine, it is necessary to pre- 
sent a clearer vision of present political system in 
Ukraine:
A. Concepts of Three Major Political Actors  
in Contemporary Ukraine
The post-Orange Ukrainian political landscape 
has clearly presented three major political “macro-
formations” in society. These include (1) a union of 
national-democratic and radical liberal-cosmopolitic 
forces; (2) the social-populist forces (allied with 
some national radicals), and (3) post-Soviet “civi-
lizational conservatives.” The components of all of 
these three blocs are “independent” or semi-inde-
pendent actors that have been able to re-group and 
form various kinds of coalitions. There are two types 
of prominent coalitions at present: either some kind 
of a class coalition, or a civilizational (non-class 
oriented) union [4].
These compound (“mixed content”) post-Social-
ist political actors are acting in “real” political life in 
present-day Ukraine within various institutions and 
political processes. And in their abstract form, there 
are three “pure types” of actors defined by the pecu-
liarities of their life values (often spiritual or quasi-
spiritual): (a) ethno-nationalism; (b) post-Soviet 
civilizational conservatism; and (c) technocratic 
populism [5].
B. The Concept of “Dual Power”  
in Ukraine
Viktor Yushchenko was trying to exercise not 
only the symbolic and conceptual authority of a con-
stitutional leader of the state, but also the elements 
of the executive power. In fact, he was executing the 
authority of a kind of latent “Revolutionary Coun-
cil.” Such an extra-legal body – the National Salva-
tion Committee – has been created during the Or-
ange Revolution [6; 7], and though it was later “dis-
missed”, its ideas and principles have been preserved 
in the consciousness of V. Yushchenko and his de-
voted supporters. The major cultural values behind 
them are a democratic version of ethno-nationalism 
and Euro-Atlantism.
That first component of the “dual power” com-
prised the institutions directly controlled by the 
President and his team: the Presidential Secretariat, 
the Council for National Security and Defence, the 
Army (Ministry of Defence), the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs, the Security Service of Ukraine (whose 
acting head had been appointed by the President in 
an extra-legal way), the Internal Troops (subordi-
nated to the President in a non-constitutional way), 
and at some stages of Ukrainian Orange (post- 
2004) politics, also the Ministry of the Interior. This 
“quasi-branch” of power included regional adminis-
trations, most heads of which were appointed by 
the President V. Yushchenko in a non-constitution-
al way. Some courts have performed as so-called 
“pocket courts” of the President, under his manipu-
lation and control. Even the Constitutional Court of 
Ukraine had been under strong elements of presi-
dential, unconstitutional control.
The other component of the “dual power” was 
the “ordinary state machinery,” which was meant to 
be under the control of the prime minister. But in-
side it, there were still some ministries and institu-
tions headed by the presidential “appointees” (the 
Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Culture, Ministry of 
Education and Science, Ministry of Health, etc.).
Such dualism of power has existed both during 
the “cohabitation” of opposing political factions, 
each one controlling different groups or compo-
nents of the state institutions, and during the joint 
exercise of the supreme state power by the former 
Orange allies.
ukraine’s major political parties’  
and blocs’ positions concerning  
the South ossetian conflict
At the start of the conflict in South Ossetia, the 
President and “his” political bloc (NU–NS, or “Our 
Ukraine”–“People’s Self-Defence”) energetically 
supported Georgia’s territorial integrity and accused 
Russia of aggression. They spent their energy com-
paring Georgia’s security problems with Ukraine’s. 
In practical terms, this camp was trying to limit the 
Russian Black Sea fleet, and supported the Ukrain-
ian policy of supplying weapons to Georgia. The 
aim was to use the war situation in Georgia to speed 
up Ukraine’s integration into NATO. The pro-Yush-
chenko political bloc was also trying to win over the 
political bloc backing the prime minister, by making 
her take risky anti-Russian steps. Otherwise there 
would have been threats to dismiss the current gov-
ernment by destroying the ruling coalition by using 
presidential constitutional powers and his perso- 
nal influence on his “coreligionaries”. In rhetoric, 
Ukraine’s “national-democrats” had some addition-
al support on the part of marginal nationalist forces. 
But their extremist proposals served to destabilise 
the situation in Ukraine.
A second political position was held by the 
“Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc” (BYuT). This group was 
very cautious in trying to balance its pro-European 
rhetoric with practical steps to improve its relations 
with Russia. Its positions demanded that its populist 
leader, Yu. Tymoshenko, make incredible zigzags in 
her political stands, as a bit more than one year be-
fore the South Ossetian conflict she had published 
an aggressive anti-Russian article called “Contain-
ing Russia” [8] *. But soon Yu. Tymoshenko, the prime 
minister of Ukraine, “became a realist” (in under-
standing the very complex nature of Ukraine’s rela-
tions with Russia) and got rid of her aggressiveness 
toward Russia. She soon began using just the EU 
formulas in her assessment of the conflict.
Finally, the Party of Regions was always very 
friendly towards Russia. Viktor Yanukovych, the 
party’s leader, after the Russian Federation’s offi- 
cial recognition of independence of South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia (on 26 August 2008), had several 
times mentioned the radical idea that “Ukraine 
should appreciate the will of the peoples of South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia and recognise their independ-
ence” [10]. Although the Party of Regions did not 
take up V. Yanokovych’s suggestion, it nonetheless 
was actively criticising the “Saakashvili regime” 
and its Ukrainian supporters (including President 
V. Yushchenko) and initiated the organisation of a 
special parliamentary commission to review 
Ukraine’s military supplies to Georgia. Regional 
and local organisations of the Party of Regions in 
Eastern and Sothern Ukraine actively conducted 
campaigns aimed at collecting and delivering hu-
manitarian aid to South Ossetia; and a number of 
* Though subsequently it became clear that most of Yu. Ti mo-
shenko’s tough arguments in that article were in fact not hers. As the 
“Foreign Affairs” editor has written in this regard, “An essay in the 
May/June issue of Foreign Affairs paraphrased a number of separate 
sentences from the writings of Henry Kissinger. A representative of 
the essay’s author claims that attribution was not provided because 
of an impression that Foreign Affairs does not incorporate citations. 
… Foreign Affairs regrets the misimpression” [9].
local and regional authorities controlled by that par-
ty passed political resolutions demanding recogni-
tion of independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
[see e.g.: 11; 12].
It is worth mentioning that having been elected 
to the post of President of Ukraine, Viktor Yanuko-
vych has stated that the issue of recognizing the in-
dependence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia “is not 
on the agenda” [13].
As for Ukraine’s Communists, they have been 
always the most active critics of official Georgian 
policy, and of the Ukrainian President’s policy vis-
à-vis Georgia. Ukraine’s communists proved to be 
enthusiastic supporters of South Ossetia’s and Abk-
hazia’s independence.
coverage of the South ossetian  
conflict on Tv and cleavages  
in ukrainian Society 
After the conflict in South Ossetia had started, 
Russia almost immediately became an active par-
ticipant in the war. But at the beginning, the conflict 
between Ossetia and Georgia was viewed as a for-
eign internal matter by the Ukrainian media, and 
Ukrainian journalists were not sent to Georgia to 
cover the war.
Once Russia started its military operations, it was 
not easy to get to Georgia by air. Almost all of the 
airlines refused to send their planes to Georgia, while 
Ukrainian insurance companies refused to insure re-
porter’s lives. It was possible to get into Georgia only 
with the help of official charter flights, which were 
normally used by refugees and politicians. Under 
such circumstances, Ukrainian TV channels had to 
resort to using local correspondents from Georgia’s 
own media channels. Paata Yakobiashvili, a reporter 
for the Georgian TV-channel “Rustavi 2,” comment-
ed by phone for several Ukrainian media outlets from 
the hot spots in Georgia.
When Georgians were announcing their victo-
ries, Russian media were publishing contrary infor-
mation. This was not just a war of the battlefield, but 
a war of information as well. On several days during 
the war, Georgian websites were not working prop-
erly. This made the media’s job difficult, because in 
every newsroom journalists are used to accessing 
Internet content. Soon Ukrainian media had access 
almost only to Russian sources of information.
Ukraine’s main TV channels labeled the Russia–
Georgia conflict as a war. Ukrainian TV channels 
initially did not take an openly pro-Russian or pro-
Georgian slant. They were acting as platforms where 
journalists initially gave balanced, differing points 
of view. The mass media highlighted that South Os-
setia, Georgia and Russia were all, in their individu-
al ways, active participants in the war, and contrasted 
Yakushik V. The impact of the South Ossetian conflict on Ukrainian politics 55
56 НАУКОВІ ЗАПиСКи.  Том 108.  Політичні науки
the role of these parties with the passivity of the EU, 
NATO and Ukraine itself. This was important given 
that Ukraine’s President at the time, V. Yushchenko, 
had the support of the Georgians during the Orange 
Revolution in 2004, and given that Georgia’s presi-
dent, M. Saakashvili, had received his higher educa-
tion in Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine, and was a well-
known friend of the Yushchenko family.
Still, Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko played a 
waiting game during the conflict, not siding with 
any party. This move was seen by political experts 
as possible reverence for Russia or as a manifesta-
tion of the traditional anti-presidential position of a 
Ukrainian prime minister with her own presidential 
ambitions.
The topic of war between Georgia and Russia 
was covered not just in the TV news, but in well-
known talk shows as well. The political experts 
who appeared on these talk shows tried to analyze 
whether the threat from Russia was real for Ukraine 
in the context of the Crimean question. Even after 
the war was over, news programmes continued to 
broadcast stories about Georgian families who 
came into Ukraine, where Ukrainian sister towns 
were waiting for them.
TV channels in Ukraine are controlled by vari-
ous economic groups connected with particular po-
litical interests. As a result, they displayed various 
kinds of political biases in covering the South Os-
setian conflict. While there were no openly “pro-
Russian” channels in Ukraine, it could be said that 
“Inter” and “TRK Ukraina” were more favourable 
towards Russia. Moreover, Russian TV channels 
form part of the “cultural space” for a number of 
Ukrainians (especially via cable TV and satellite 
TV), in particular those living in the East and South. 
So, many Ukrainians were directly exposed to the 
Russian government’s official positions.
Western media is also accessible to cable and sat-
ellite TV users, but to a lesser extent than Russian 
media. The positions of Western media were predom-
inantly critical of Russia. Still, because Ukrainian 
media extensively uses Western media news prod-
ucts, the indirect impact of the Western media (as seen 
on Ukrainian TV channels) remained quite strong.
Georgian official propaganda, on the other hand, 
impacted Ukrainian public opinion only very slight-
ly and not so efficiently. Even the presence of Geor-
gian diplomats and politicians on the talk show pro-
grammes was not very effective (sometimes because 
of the biases of Ukrainian organizers, as in the case 
of the presentation of the Georgian ambassador at 
“TRK Ukraina”). Russia had already prepared a 
documentary on the Ossetian war (“War 08.08.08. 
History of Treachery” [14]) and made its presenta-
tion a top media hook, especially because of the 
awkward attempts by the Security Service of 
Ukraine to create problems for its presentation. Usu-
ally lagging behind, Georgian media propaganda 
made an interesting attempt to fill the gap by a Geor-
gian documentary in Russian called “The Chroni-
cles of Georgian August,” which was depicted as 
“the first film based not on emotions, but on docu-
mentary materials,” as the journalist Ia Barateli put 
it when launching the film on 24 January 2009 [15]. 
Some study visits and seminars in Georgia that were 
organized by various Georgian organizations served 
as an efficient tool for influencing the Ukrainian pro-
fessional community (in particular journalists), and 
especially impressing were the visits to the sights of 
the recent warfare, and meetings with  internally 
displaced persons or refugees. But the overall infor-
mation resources imposed by Russia were much 
stronger than those of Georgia in influencing Ukrain-
ian public opinion. Still, it would be wrong to con-
clude that the core of the issue in forming the attitude 
of the Ukrainian public was just material resources. 
The role of “civilizational instincts” and “historic 
memories” were of a much higher importance, irre-
spective of a present day mass-media influence.
In this context, unofficial Georgian interpreta-
tions of the nature of the cleavages in Ukraine’s so-
ciety are important to note. Special monitoring of 
Ukrainian public opinion by Georgian state struc-
tures most likely was not conducted. One high-rank-
ing Georgian diplomat, in a private conversation 
with the author, had mentioned that the strong “pro-
Ossetian” and “pro-Russian” positions among many 
Ukrainians may be explained by the fact that “the 
Russian ambassador has much more funds available 
than the Georgian one.”
The present research did not aspire to find the 
percentage of supporters of each of the major posi-
tions in Ukraine concerning the conflict in South 
Ossetia: (a) “pro-Georgian”, (b) “pro-Ossetian” or 
“pro-Russian”, or (c) “neutral,” but rather to dis-
cover the roots of the cleavages on this issue that 
clearly reflect the core political and cultural cleav-
ages in contemporary Ukraine in general. Nonethe-
less, professional public opinion polls conducted in 
Ukraine during and after the 2008 South Ossetian 
war clearly demonstrate that a significant majority 
of Ukraine’s citizens are in support of Russia rather 
than of Georgia (see e.g.: [16]).
In analyzing present-day relations between Rus-
sia and the nations of its “near abroad,” and the 
prospects for the near, mid-term, and long-term fu-
ture, there should be taken into account various 
types of approaches (open, or latent, or quite possi-
ble in the future) based on different strategic visions 
(by the relevant actors) of the correlation between 
someone’s perception of their own ethnicity and the 
responsibility for (and the attachment to) a particu-
lar society (socio-political entity). These are per-
ceived either in global terms, or regional, or local, 
or dispersed throughout). There are the following 
major types of approaches: (1) the tribalist or “fel-
low-countrymen” (“regional clan”) approach; (2) 
the approach of a typical ethno-nationalism of a de-
veloped nation; (3) the nationalism of a “super-eth-
nos” (or “supra-ethnos”), or of a “strategic union” 
of ethnoses (not necessarily culturally kin – for ex-
ample, the concepts of a united Europe, or of a 
Slavic–Turkic cultural-civilizational world); (4) po-
litical citizenship approaches (with the main stress 
on the values of a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural “po-
litical nation”); and (5) the predominance of a poli-
ticized, global cultural-and-political project (purely 
political, or religious-and-political) of one or anoth-
er kind, etc. [17]. The most important aspect in the 
influence of the South Ossetian conflict on Ukraini-
an society consisted in bringing to the surface of 
Ukrainian political and cultural life two major vec-
tors in a conscious or subconscious vision of the na-
tion’s development, as well as in a corresponding 
sense of cultural and spiritual belonging: (a) a mul-
tifaceted “Russian world” consisting of a number of 
sovereign and semi-sovereign (or even just autono-
mous) entities (“Russian” here refers to a sense of 
cultural belonging to Rus and its historic inheritors, 
a special type of cultural world similar in magnitude 
to either a European/Western, or a Chinese, or an 
Arab, or an Indian world, etc.; but definitely not just 
to a Russian Federation’s “political world”); or (b) a 
subordinate part of some other civilizational, cul-
tural world yet to be defined.
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Якушик В. М.
ВПлиВ ПіВДеННо­оСетиНСьКоГо КоНфліКтУ  
НА ПолітиКУ В УКРАїНі
У статті розглянуто вплив війни 2008 р. між Росією і Грузією в Південній Осетії на процес по-
дальшого прояснення ліній культурно-політичного розмежування в сучасній Україні. 
Ключові слова: політика, Україна, Росія, Грузія, Південна Осетія.
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